Hynix v Ramubs (San Jose, CA) - RMBS opposition to Hynix's motion to dismiss (Part I)

Defendant Rambus Inc.'s Opposition To Hynix's Motion To Dismiss Patent Claims For Unclean Hands On The Basis Of Collateral Estoppel

Snippets . . . . Part I (I will post more later today)

Hynix cannot avoid having to litigate is own allegations unless it proves each and every required element of collateral estoppel: “(1) there was a full and fair opportunity to litigate the issue in the previous ation; (2) the issue was actually litigated in that ation; (3) the issue was lost as a result of a final judgment in that action; and (4) the person against whom collateral estoppel is asserted in the present action was a party or in privity with a party in the previous action.”. (p.5, l. 13)

Numerous factually complex issues can be raised as to the fullness and fairness of the Virginia proceedings, which, for example, focused heavily on prior art references allegedly missing from Rambus patent files without requiring a showing of how any such references, even if they existed anywhere, could anticipate or render obvious the three specific Rambus patent claims at issue in Virginia. (p.5, l. 21)

Hynix’s brief glides past the demanding standard that the Ninth Circuit requires of a party in Hynix’s position. (p.5, l. 28)

Hynix’s motion fails at the outset because the Infineon court did not issue any of the findings to which Hynix asks this Court to afford collateral estoppel (p.6, l. 18)

Collateral estoppel does not apply when there is no “final judgment.”(p.6, l. 22)

The Virginia court’s two-sentence conclusion fails to satisfy Rule 51 not because it was spoken rather than written, but rather because it was expressly incomplete and preliminary and did not “find facts specially and state separately . . .conclusions of law thereon.” (p.8, l. 3)

Even if the March 1 oral statements were capable of being given preclusive effect (which they were not), the consent judgment forecloses any preclusion, and certainly does not itself give preclusive effect where none existed before. (p.11, l.13)

In direct contraction to the gloss given by Hynix, the Bonner Mall Court expressly noted the salutary effect of its rule in encouraging settlement “at an earlier stage,” before the district court entered judgment.” (p.15, l. 17)

The absence of any final decision setting forth clear factual findings leads directly to the second fatal deficiency in Hynix’s motion: its failure to prove “with clarity and certainty,” (cite), that the identical issues that is seeks to preclude Rambus from litigating in this Court were “actually and necessarily decided” by the Infineon court. (p.16, l.3)